'Epistemology' is a fraught term for what Walter D. Mignolo calls 'de-colonial' critique.
This article explores this duality of epistemology and episteme in the academic study of colonialism, neo-colonialism, and what Mignolo calls 'coloniality/modernity,' taking interest in contemporary anxieties about social scientific methods that were often carved out during periods of European colonial expansion. I want to show that the disjunction between epistemology and the episteme leads to some difficulties in accounting for the work of gathering sources and organising knowledge claims that are required to critique others' ways of knowing. In particular, I note some difficulties involved in the gendering of historiographical methods that grant Mignolo and others access to the colonial archive, and argue that the focus on 'ways of thinking' can limit sensitivity to the social character of knowledge formation and transmission. The article begins by revisiting Claude Lévi-Strauss's structural anthropology as a cultural relativist response to colonial violence, then considers the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari as critics of epistemology tout court, who argue for a different account of power formations informed by their engagement with psychoanalysis. Finally, the article surveys Walter D. Mignolo's critique of coloniality/modernity as an epistemic configuration and looks at the solutions he offers by focusing on the geo-politics of textual production.
Feeling and communicating with Claude Lévi-Strauss
Drawing on a variety of ethnographic methods, Lévi-Strauss's structuralism is ostensibly grounded in an extensive, sometimes obsessive, 'observation of facts ' (1977: 280) , and is thus 'based on the sincerity and honesty of him [sic] who can say … "I was there; such-and-such happened to me; you will believe it to be there yourself" ' (1966: 117) . Faced with an excess of fieldwork observations in 'exotic' cultures, Lévi-Strauss's own analytical method mirrors that of his own 'bricoleur,' taking 'to pieces and reconstruct [ing] sets of events (on a physical, socio-historical or technical plane) and [using] them as so many indestructible pieces for structural patterns ' (1972: 33) .
Structural anthropology is a Humpty-Dumpty procedure: break things apart, taxonomise, then put back together as a set of relations, a social totality defined in terms of internal logical principles. For Lévi-Strauss, the unity of the 'scattered fragments' (Humpty-offthe-wall) with which the anthropologist deals is in the subjective consciousness of 'primitive man [sic] ' himself, whose thought 'is founded on [the] demand for order' (10). In this way, the method of anthropology is not simply one among others, but is a social scientific translation of the 'method' of 'primitive peoples,' some of whom Lévi-Strauss describes as 'sociologists … as colleagues with whom one may freely confer ' (1987: 49) .
From which universal human need does the 'demand for order' derive? For Lévi-Strauss, the social provision of a language for human emotions can help us 'undergo in an ordered and intelligible form a real experience that would otherwise be chaotic and inexpressible ' (Lévi-Strauss 1977: 198) . Unconscious classifications may involve accommodations to 'social powers' from outside, certainly, but they also help us to overcome the threat from within, for the transition to 'verbal expression' can induce 'the release of the physiological process, that is, the reorganization, in a favourable direction, of the process to which [a person experiencing pain] is subjected ' (1977: 198) . Cultural institutions based in collective social participation allow human beings to transfer disorderly affective experiences into orderly sign-structures (1987: 7) . Lévi-Strauss thus offers a compelling argument for cultural relativism, because the human capacity to stabilise ambiguous or volatile experiences depends on the community-based affordances of language, habit, and art. In this context, Lévi-Strauss's critique of colonialism, expressed circuitously throughout Tristes Tropiques (1955) but more explicitly in later lectures and papers (Lévi-Strauss 1966) , is not simply that cultures should be preserved; after all, different peoples have constantly modified their shared systems of communication. Rather, it is the synchronicity of an internally organised community that guarantees no person will be exposed to inarticulable or inexpressible cruelties-destitution, abject poverty, starvation and so on. Following French sociologist Marcel Mauss, Lévi-Strauss is concerned that Western colonialism displaces shared cultural codes with unsustainable motives-profit, exploitation, unchecked military growth-creating a European 'humanity alienated from itself' and making 'so many men [sic] the objects of execration and contempt ' (1966: 122) . Although confident in the virtues of European social sciences, Lévi-Strauss is a critic of a Eurocentrism that holds the global expansion of money, labour and commodities as an unquestionable good for humanity as whole, and points out-as many have done since-that the communal ethic structuring social relationships among Europeans were not extended to the treatment of the non-European peoples with whom colonialists and imperialists had (often coercive) exchanges. Correspondingly, Lévi-Strauss is optimistic that a community not alienated from itself would be incapable of treating 'a single race or people on the surface of the earth … as an object' (123).
Since at least the 1960s cultural relativism has often been viewed as a politically reactionary stance, not only because the cultural status quo is implicitly preferred against radical social transformation, but also because it de-politicises the space of cultural translation, such that the political circumstances of professional inquiry into colonised peoples are hidden by rhetorical invocations of absolute Otherness (see Fanon 1963; Mignolo 2007) . Lévi-Strauss's data was grounded in the basic claim that 'I was there,' but 'there' was always a product of contemporary struggles over political power, in which colonial administrators' own 'ethnographies' created 'fertile ground' for professional ethnographers' accounts of unresolvable cultural differences (Pels & Salemink 1994: 11, 14) . What Frantz Fanon criticised as the 'cultural congresses' of 'bourgeois intellectuals' deflected questions about the legitimacy of colonial States by fetishising the correct or incorrect administration of traditions and customs (Fanon 1963: 43) . The ensuing challenge to social anthropology was twofold: firstly, how does one conduct ethnographic research when both the object of research and the objectivity of the researcher can no longer be taken for granted? Secondly, how does one distinguish between the social scientific search for cultural order, and the political search for ways to justify ordering others-even, or especially, by way of 'culture'?
The first problem is one of renewing objectivity, but the second pierces the membrane between descriptions of 'how things really are' and the professional imperative to carve out spaces of legitimacy from within State-sponsored institutions. Lévi-Strauss speaks from the vantage point of a State intent on securing knowledge for the purposes of, as he himself would often claim, salvaging local cultures (Lévi-Strauss 1966) , but the salvation workers also ascribe to themselves legitimacy and authority in the process. In
Tristes Tropiques, the subject of Western modernity is at once convicted of abusing State instruments and interpellated as responsible for fixing the 'native situation' by the redeployment of those same instruments. In the following section I examine one attempt to circumvent the self-legitimising exercises of the European social sciences in the philosophical work of Deleuze and Guattari. Yet for Deleuze and Guattari, too many examples abounded of 'segregative' territorialisations within the Left itself, 'enclaves whose archaism is just as capable of nourishing a modern fascism as of freeing a revolutionary charge ' (2004: 279) . The authors' concern with revolutionary movements is not over matters of principle or political representation, but in the informal conduits of desire that multiply microfascistic sedimentations around whatever principles or representational strategies are chosen-even benign or peaceable ones. Communal living can be terrifying, but this does not mean the ideologies have failed-they may even have worked too well:
Two orders of politics

Deleuze and Guattari published
The masses certainly do not passively submit to power; nor do they 'want' to be repressed, in a kind of masochistic hysteria; nor are they tricked by ideological lure. Desire is never separable from complex assemblages that necessarily tie into molecular levels, from micro-formations already shaping postures, attitudes, perceptions, expectations, semiotic systems ... It's too easy to be antifascist on the molar level, and not even see the fascist inside you, the fascist you yourself sustain and nourish and cherish with molecules both personal and collective. (Deleuze & Guattari 2004b: 237) This is an important departure from structuralist reason. For Lévi-Strauss, social relations are formed through shared structures of communication, such that collective toxicities are assumed to be manifested within a group's sign-systems. For example, social violence would be expected to show itself through everyday semiotic codifications of self and other, the rulers and the ruled, the permissible and the prohibited, and so on. For Deleuze and Guattari, by contrast, qualitative variations in the affective bonds between people make revolutionary groups capable of becoming microfascistic, or transform a sound principle into a damaging social practice. Political desire involves not only systems of ideas but also direct investments into the social field, history, and mythology, and also into events, affects, and 'partial objects' (an ear, a tune, fractured memories). Structuralism bites its own tail because it accounts for 'order' only in the grammar of signification, so that even a critique of order is always a re-ordering, a demystification of one arrangement by way of another, ad infinitum. Thus the noncoincidence of social logics with political ideologies strikes at a great weakness of structural anthropology, because within mass social and political mobilisations 'the most contradictory ideas can exist side by side and tolerate each other, without any conflict arising from the logical contradiction between them' (Freud 1949: 18) Deleuze & Guattari 1986: 24) . Adequate responses to cultural nationalism, for example, must complement the critique of signification with heighted sensitivity to 'reorganisation of functions' and 're-grouping of forces' transposed from homes to workplaces to schools (Deleuze & Guattari 2004b: 353) . Signification is not the enemy:
as Dorothea Olkowski has observed, sometimes the most pernicious microfascisms feed on communication breakdown and political confusion, as when the Ku Klux Klan affectively disrupted an organised citizens' commemoration of Martin Luther King Jr. (Olkowski 1993) . Slogans, symbols and even epistemes can, in some small way, accommodate participatory interlocution, but many other socialised practices of violence are not so transparent. Micro-politics between the cracks can be far more dangerous than politics in public.
Deleuze and Guattari extend this framework in their discussions of colonialism. In AntiOedipus the authors borrow the term 'internal colonialism' (first proposed by Gonzalez Casanova) to describe the 'interior colony' of the bourgeois European household:
'Oedipus is always colonization pursued by other means, it is the interior colony, and we shall see that even here at home, where we Europeans are concerned, it is our intimate colonial education' (Deleuze & Guattari 2004b: 186) . Closed circuits of investment in familial hierarchies do not simply anticipate the 'paternalistic' violence of the colonial administration, but rather it is the global character of nationalism, nativism, and political antagonism that insinuates itself into families, schools, workplaces and informal private spaces, for 'Oedipus depends on this sort of nationalistic, religious, racist sentiment, and not the reverse' (Deleuze & Guattari 2004b: 114; see also Laurie & Stark 2012: 23-24) . There is thus a back-and-forth movement between public mythologies of conquest and ethnocentric entitlement, and the banal habituations of 'cultured' social relations that slide beneath imperial ideologies proper:
We will always be failures at playing African or Indian, even Chinese, and no voyage to the South Seas, however arduous, will allow us to cross the wall, get out of the whole, or lose our face … These are Eastern physical and spiritual exercises, but for a couple, like a conjugal bed tucked with a Chinese sheet: you did do your exercises today, didn't you? (Deleuze & Guattari 2004b: 209; see also 106, 305) Informal 'affective' economies and their attendant significations are not necessarily stable insofar as capitalism tends towards the absolute 'deterritorialisation' of persons, objects, places and values. Furthermore, Deleuze and Guattari are careful to show that all societies exhibit some oscillation between the 'filial' reproduction of social relationships ('administrative and hierarchical') and the supple reworking of values, identities and geographies through lateral 'alliances' ('political and economic') (2004a: 161). There is no reason to be suspicious of doxa, routine or discipline except insofar as they participate in toxic institutional activities and their social extensions-something we can never completely know in advance, because these relations of participation are constantly changing. Correspondingly, whatever academic tools we use to study political power-whether sociological, anthropological, philosophical or otherwise-are subject to all types of appropriation at the borderline ('all that counts is the constantly shifting borderline'), especially in periods when academic institutions are misaligned with political interests, or when 'the State as organism has problems with its own collective bodies' (Deleuze & Guattari 2004b: 404) .
Gendering politics
Depending on one's viewpoint, Deleuze and Guattari either provide a remarkable insight into important differences between existing social multiplicities and the orderly 'epistemological' subject of the Kantian tradition, or they paralyze the critical obligation to condemn nefarious ideologies, an obligation that depends on producing some evaluation of conflicting positions or perspectives. A peculiar kind of relativism can certainly be detected throughout A Thousand Plateaus, the second volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, in which Deleuze and Guattari consistently remind their reader that no type of organisation is 'better' than another. For example, the micropolitical 'line of molecularisation' can be distinguished from macro-political identitybased movements, yet 'we will not say that it is necessarily better ' (2004b: 217) ; between the State and the 'affective' social mobilisations of the 'war machine,' the latter 'answers to other rules. We are not saying that they are better, of course' (395), and then later, 'who could say which is better and which is worse? It is true that war kills, and hideously mutilates. But it is especially true after the State has appropriated the war machine' (470); and finally, in the case of the State and social stratification, the question 'is not whether the status of women, or those on the bottom, is better or worse, but the type of organization from which that status results' (231).
Philosophy inevitably addresses itself to problems that admit some profound ambivalence or uncertainty: this is, perhaps, its professional and pedagogical virtue. Yet there is a risk here of under-determining social analysis by reaching the same conclusion-'we cannot say'-regardless of circumstance. In order to perform an adequate sensitivity to ambivalence, Deleuze and Guattari deploy a reading strategy so attentive to indeterminacy that any denunciation of categorically objectionable violence or inequality becomes immediately suspect. In producing the question, 'who could say which is better and which is worse?,' Deleuze and Guattari must first evict this 'who' of any potential occupants, so that no person could simply respond, 'I can say which is better and which is worse.' Let's consider an example from Anti-Oedipus. Deleuze and Guattari cite Edmund Leach's discussions of 'groups of men residing in the same area, or in neighbouring areas, who arrange marriages and shape concrete reality to a much greater extent than do systems of filiation ' (2004a: 161-62 ' (2004a: 180) . The germinal influx is repressed by 'the great coders,' those men who 'meet and assemble to take wives for themselves, to negotiate for them, to share them' (178-80). The 'germinal influx,' and women's biological relationship to it, is described only in oblique terms as an intensity of desire, to be contrasted with investments in extensive social networks and alliances, implicitly aligned with the male political sphere.
Returning to the example prompting Deleuze and Guattari's discussion, Leach's 'groups of men' were the product of ethnographic study conducted partly while on active military service in Burma (Leach 1961: v-vi, 114-23 challenges to sex-role differentiation (Leibowitz 1975: 22) .
My criticism here is not only that Deleuze and Guattari's pay insufficient attention to women in anthropology. Indeed, the burgeoning anthropology of women in the 1970s
was fraught with many of the methodological problems extant in Deleuze and Guattari's own work (Ebron 2001: 225 
Walter D. Mignolo and the geo-politics of translation
This article cannot do justice to the broad scope of Mignolo's oeuvre, but will focus instead on his framing of epistemic differences with respect to modernity/coloniality. In is nothing wrong in the fact that a given group of people put forward its own cosmovision,' and advocates 'a world in which many worlds will co-exist ' (2007: 499) .
In keeping with the thesis of Tristes Tropiques (1955), problems arise 'when a limited number of people feel they are appointed by God to bring (their) good to the rest of humanity. That is … the provincial pretense to universality' (Mignolo 2007: 493) . But
Mignolo is not interested in retrieving 'an authentic knowledge from Chinese, Arabic or Aymara,' but instead seeks to include in the foundation of knowledge 'subjectivities understanding of graphic semiotics precludes any holistic analysis of the internal cultural politics of Amerindian societies (Monaghan 1994: 96-97 Guattari, issues of gender are never allowed to disturb the epistemological scaffolding of political philosophy, a discipline that must frequently gauge social consciousness from borrowed ethnographic or historical research.
Working between philology and political philosophy, Mignolo encounters comparable problems to those raised in Deleuze and Guattari's discourse on gender and alliance. On the one hand, he is suspicious of cultural relativism and its propensity to neutralise power by appealing to ahistorical cultural worldviews (Mignolo 1995: 15; . On the other hand, Mignolo draws on a methodological procedure deeply imbedded within structuralist anthropology; namely, the indexing of 'culture' to a collection of signs supposed to express the epistemes shared by all members of a given community. These are not fatal flaws in Mignolo's argument, but they do shed light on some crossroads in his own borderlands. The resounding strength of Mignolo's work is to create a space where multiple anti-colonial, post-colonial and de-colonial knowledges exist side-byside and stretch across many centuries. Deleuze, Guattari and Mignolo all challenge the paradigms of cultural relativism and force political engagement with the legacies and trajectories of social scientific inquiry. However, these same critics can also be found reshuffling old cards, turning the 'raw materials' of social scientific inquiry into figurative topes, whether the mythical personages that populate Deleuze and Guattari's prose or Mignolo's border Gnostic, who has long ceased to be an epistemologically bounded research participant in universities or other machineries of knowledge production. The somewhat facile epistemological questions-how does one come to learn about colonialism, through which social contexts and lived experiences, and what are the important ethical objections to coloniality or its legacy?-are so greatly eclipsed by epistemic anxiety that the 'discourse on colonialism' becomes a 'discourse on the discourse on colonialism.' From this latter position it can be impossible to become disentangled.
Postscript on the public intellectual
During an interview conducted in 1989, Deleuze responded to a question about a debate surrounding the wearing of veils in French schools. He suggested that the 'spontaneous will of the young girls involved seems particularly reinforced by the pressure of parents who are anti-secular,' and then considered some possible ramifications of the debate:
It's a matter of knowing just how far the Islamic associations want to take their demands. Will the second phase be to demand the right to Islamic prayer in the class room? And then will the third phase be to demand a reassessment of the literature taught in the class room, claiming that a text by Racine or Voltaire is an offense to Muslim dignity? (Deleuze 2007: 365) Deleuze cited, as his preference, 'a secular movement among the Arabs themselves.'
The interview is entitled simply, 'A Slippery Slope.' Tradition is not critiqued in itself, but is understood as a movement within a European frame of reference, in which the French national became both commentator and potential victim of the racial and cultural
Other. Deleuze's final court of appeal becomes the freedom of great literatures, but we do not know for whom Racine and Voltaire are worth defending (the French? professors of literature? Penguin Classics?), nor are we told of the numerous exclusions from French classrooms of books considered an affront to Christian sensibilities or those of European secularism. The doubt cast speculatively on the girls' commitment to their veils-'We can't be sure that the young girls feel all that strongly about it' (Deleuze 2007: 363) -only obscured the fact that Deleuze, rather than the young girls, was being interviewed by Libération. What Deleuze is saying certainly bespeaks an episteme, but is also inconsistent with his own claims elsewhere about the dangers of authority and speaking for others. It is in part the inconsistency introduced by the situation of speaking (in this case a magazine, an audience, the professional motivations of a philosopher and so on) and not the speaker's published epistemic commitments that contains the danger, because political violence can pass as much by way of caprice and contradiction as it does by doctrine and dogma.
